Rethinking Visitation: From a Parental to a Relational Right

[...] visitation rights are considered to arise from the very fact of parenthood, so that parents are entitled to this right simply by being legally recognized as parents. [...] visitation rights are subject to the general rule of parental exclusivity: only a child\u27s legal parents have rights considered parental, and non-parents cannot acquire them

Rethinking Visitation: From a Parental to a Relational Right

The article proposes a new understanding of the right to visitation that challenges the common understanding of the right to visitation as a parental right and as an integral component of the cluster of rights associated with parental status. Instead, it suggests that visitation be understood as an independent right based on relational values. Understanding visitation as a parental right marginalizes relational values and thwarts the development of a coherent theory of visitation. The absence of such a theory could account for the perplexity plaguing visitation issues. Detaching visitation from the cluster of rights associated with parental status and constructing it as an independent relational right enables us to develop a theory of visitation that places questions pertaining to visitation with children within an adequate conceptual framework. This detachment will transform not only the right to visitation but legal parenthood itself, strengthening the tie between rights considered parental and day-to-day child rearing. Furthermore, it will enable recognition of visitation rights for non-parents, while also preserving the principle of exclusive parental authority

The Interplay between Tort Law and Religious Family Law: The Israeli Case [Article]

2009 AALS Symposium Panel - Foreign Tort Law: Beyond EuropeThis material published in Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law is made available by the James E. Rogers College of Law, the Daniel F. Cracchiolo Law Library, and the University of Arizona Libraries. If you have questions, please contact the AJICL Editorial Board at http://arizonajournal.org/contact-us/

Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Trusts and Estates Opinions

Author of Ch. 5: Commentary on O’Neal v. Wilkes. Book Description:For women and other marginalized groups, the reality is that the laws regulating estates and trusts may not be treating them fairly. By using popular feminist legal theories as well as their own definitions of feminism, the authors of this volume present rewritten opinions from well-known estates and trust cases. Covering eleven important cases, this collection reflects the diversity in society and explores the need for greater diversity in the law. By re-examining these cases, the contributors are able to demonstrate how women\u27s property rights, as well as the rights of other marginalized groups, have been limited by the law.https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/book_chapters/1040/thumbnail.jp

Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Trusts and Estates Opinions

Author of Ch. 5: Commentary on O’Neal v. Wilkes. Book Description:For women and other marginalized groups, the reality is that the laws regulating estates and trusts may not be treating them fairly. By using popular feminist legal theories as well as their own definitions of feminism, the authors of this volume present rewritten opinions from well-known estates and trust cases. Covering eleven important cases, this collection reflects the diversity in society and explores the need for greater diversity in the law. By re-examining these cases, the contributors are able to demonstrate how women\u27s property rights, as well as the rights of other marginalized groups, have been limited by the law.https://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/book_chapters/1040/thumbnail.jp